I. A Comparison between the Two Theories
1. Two main ideas of understanding play a central role in RD's paper (2005) : on the one hand, we have understanding of the phenomena and on the other hand we have understanding of the theories themselves with the help of which we understand phenomena. Depending on the level of complexity of the theories, we have then some other derivative ideas of understanding. On the 1 University of Bucharest, adriana.nicoleta.s@gmail.com other hand, Strevens' text (2011) deals with three kinds of understanding. In this first section I will explore the notion of understanding things or phenomena.
So, on the one sense, RD's paper can be interpreted as offering a theory of explanation as a theory of understanding. Usually, the goal of a theory of this kind (a theory of explanation) is to offer the criteria which a piece of work in science must meet in order to be considered an explanation and also the criteria for a good explanation.
What does it mean to understand a phenomenon? A plausible answer to this question, in the context of a theory of explanation, could be that understanding a phenomenon means to understand why the phenomenon happens, and why it happens in the particular way it happens. So long as our why question can be extended also to laws, we can say that we seek to understand why particular laws of nature hold. The result is that we understand a phenomenon when we are given an explanation which proceeds roughly in the following manner: from knowing certain initial conditions and some laws (which are depicted by our theories) we can derive the phenomenon that we have as explanandum. The same story goes for prediction: knowing that certain conditions happen and knowing the laws that govern the fragment of reality with which we deal, we can predict future events.
On the other hand, Strevens puts forward three notions of understanding: "understanding that", "understanding why" and "understanding with". The first of them concerns things and refers to the particular state of mind of grasping that some states of affairs happen. We can link this idea of "understanding that" with information/knowledge that is not derived and can consider that it is something specific for the knowledge of the initial conditions in an explanation. As far as "understanding why" is concerned, the result is a theory of explanation: we understand why a phenomenon happens if we have a good explanation of the phenomenon (and the entire picture previously given fits this notion very well). If we interpret RD's understanding of things as "understanding why", the type of understanding that the two papers seek is of the same type: the type of understanding that a scientific theory or an explanatory text provides us, and which is an answer to a "why question".
As we have put Strevens and RD on a common ground, we can proceed to appreciate their answers to the question of explanation, answers which are very different. On the one hand, Strevens proposes a theory of explanation in terms of causality and unification, which is a categorical definition of the notion of explanation, therefore providing necessary and sufficient conditions for being in the category of explanation. Every explanation worth bearing this name, no matter when it is given and in no matter what community, must uncover the causes that matter for the bringing about of the explanandum or uncover the causal mechanism that underlies a certain law. On the other hand, RD put forward a relativistic theory of explanation, according to which every scientific community has a particular view on explanation and tends to favor particular kinds of explanations over other kinds.
They criticize all theories of explanation that tend to offer necessary and sufficient criteria for what counts as a good explanation, or intelligible theory in their terms, and offer a cluster of features that count as objective standards for an intelligible theory (or a good theory, a real explanatory theory in the above rephrasing): causality, visualisability, locality, determinism, power of unification. The interesting fact is that a good theory does not have to possess all the properties in this bunch, but only some of them and the combination is different according to historic period and scientific community.
2.
The second idea of understanding, as we saw, applies to the theories themselves and again the two papers have different answers to this question: for RD, intelligible theory means at the same time correct or valuable theory, as they use intelligible as a criterion for the value of theories instead of truth. For Strevens, intelligible theory means theory which could be grasped by an epistemic subject; the product to which grasping applies is a correct theory, namely a coherent theory which mirrors the facts. Having this criterion in hand, by grasping a correct theory, the epistemic subject grasps at the same time the things with which the theory is concerned.
Let us see now see the criteria that a good theory (= a theory that provides understanding) has to meet, and that are supposed to vary contextually. First, there are the logical criteria, which could be specified as formal constraints on a good theory: the text of a theory should be a collection of statements put in some order not a random collection, there should be a pattern of dependence between them. Do these criteria seem to be relative? Yes and not. I think that the fact that they shouldn't be random is something that transcends locality and is universally accepted; on the other hand, whether they should be linguistic or other kinds of entities (such as diagrams) or which particular relations and patterns they should instantiate is relative and dependent on scientific and philosophical community.
Second, there are empirical criteria, which RD suggests that are interpreted differently according to historical period and scientific community. A good theory must give true predictions about the facts for sure, because otherwise it is totally unmotivated; this is a fact that every scientific community accepts, but how this desideratum is achieved depends on context.
Third, there are methodological constraints on a theory; the question that arises in connection to these ones in particular is whether we can include under this tag of methodological constraints all the considerations invoked in the previous paragraphs in connection to scientific explanation. Is the fact that explanation should take a causal form a methodological constraint? I think yes and the entire discussion about intelligibility raised in connection to explanation could be put in this context. On that basis we can raise the question of whether there are non-relativistic answers to what counts as an explanation.
Every point is touched by Strevens even though in a less detailed manner in his short paper. As far as the logical criteria are concerned, a valuable theory should be a collection of sentences with some pattern.
As far as the empirical criteria are concerned, the conditions of internal coherence and conformity to the facts seem to be the answer. I think that besides the different views of the methodology and ontology of explanation, the point in which the two views under discussion differ is the different account of the empirical criteria of a theory and of how tight must be the relation of conformity between theory and facts.
How can we assess the truth of a particular theory on Strevens' model? Probably by good predictions offered by a particular theory, given some initial known conditions; the value of good predictions is assured by conformity to the facts. But do we have grounds to suppose that a theory that gives good predictions is also a true theory in the sense of constituting an image of the facts? From this considerations, on a realist perspective, we can derive a consequence concerning the correctness of theories: a theory that gives good predictions at a particular time could be considered correct and by performing an argument to the best explanation true according to reality (independent of the fact that it proves false at a later stage of science).
By comparison, RD do not seem to have as aim an answer to this particular question: I underlie "seem" because it does not appear explicitly in the text but we can presuppose it so long as they talk of the value of theories in particular contexts. Their point seems to be the following one: a theory is valuable so long as it offers good predictions, so long as it is useful for our purposes, no matter whether or not it mirrors the facts. Nonetheless this is only an interpretation and the question still persists: can we suppose that their relativist criteria of a good explanation go hand in hand with a relativist conception of truth or a relativist criterion of the value of theories? 3. One particular principle of intelligibility of theories plays a major role in RD's paper and this deserves a longer discussion: a theory is intelligible if it allows us to make good qualitative predictions. This is the only trans-historical principle which the two authors put forward and which is supposed to give a definition of understanding, definition that seems to lack from other conceptions that make use of it (like Friedman's in Friedman (1974) ) but leave it unexplained.
The two authors identify two aspects of a scientific theory: a qualitative aspect, which can be linked with the empirical content of the theory and a quantitative aspect which can be linked with the mathematical factors introduced to describe the qualitative aspects. In other words, a scientific theory depicts a range of objects, between which it states certain relations; these relations in turn, can be described in a more or less specific manner, the mathematical equations being the most exact manner of describing these relations. The understanding of a theory presupposes both these levels, it is a sum of the two components. Nevertheless, the two authors believe that the two components can be dissociated and that we can understand the theory although we have only the qualitative one, without a technical mastering of formulas deployed in exact calculations. One of their arguments is the idea that a computer that can master very well the mathematical apparatus and can deliver precise calculations does not have understanding of the theories it employs or understanding of the phenomena depicted by the theories.
On the other hand, RD do not discuss in detail what does it mean for a scientist or group of scientists to understand a theory, apart from the fact that they can give accurate qualitative predictions with the help of the theory. Strevens is more clear on this point, by considering that understanding means grasping a correct theory; he does not elucidate the concept of grasping, but leaves open the possibility of a characterization of this concept in a theory different from a theory of explanation, namely in epistemology or in the philosophy of mind.
In light of the objection that we can understand false theories, Strevens introduces his third concept of understanding, namely "understanding with". Can we reconcile here the views of the papers and consider that "understanding with" is focused on understanding theories and is related to predictability? I think that the two views can be reconciled: Strevens' understanding with implies the use of some particular theory to derive explanations and predictions of particular events, while on RD's view a theory is intelligible when you succeed in deriving qualitative predictions of the things which the theory is aimed at explaining.
II. Critical points
In this section I will present three objections to the kind of conception offered by RD: 1. the paper does not sufficiently characterize the idea of understanding; 2. constructing a theory of understanding instead of a theory of explanation and using understanding as a criterion for the value of theories are problematic; 3. they tend to underestimate the quantitative side of predictions and the fact that understanding things by explanations comes into degrees 1. A particular objection which could be raised in connection with such a theory as RD's one, promoting the idea of understanding besides some other ideas of truth or knowledge is that it is inflationist. Is there something special that understanding can offer above and beyond knowledge or above and beyond truth? My answer is yes, but I do not endorse this idea for the same reason as RD. Therefore, in the following pages of this section I will develop two points: 1. we don't need a theory of understanding instead of a theory of explanation as far as understanding phenomena/things is concerned, unless we want to be relativists; but at the same time we can offer strong reasons for not being relativists; 2. a theory of understanding is well motivated in the case of understanding the theories themselves, and via theories the things themselves.
1.1. In RD's paper, the introduction the notion of understanding is motivated by the need to unify scientific theories. Instead of saying that the theories in every scientific community aim at providing truth/knowledge, where truth is relative to the community (given their different means of insight into the nature of things) you can say that every scientific community provides understanding. The latter concept becomes a measure of the success of a scientific theory and of the scientific practice of a community; it is also accompanied by a plurality of models of explanatory theories.
Given RD's point of view concerning the theory of explanation, my question is: why do we need to accept more than one model of explanation? In my view there is only one reason why we should accept different models of explanation: there is no unity at the level of things that could allow us to have a single model of explanation, so that different kinds of things compel us to have different kinds of explanations. RD's motivation is far from this idea. The motivation that can support their plurality of models of explanations is a particular view of science, one that does not construct scientific explanations as images of things, models where truth does not play a central role, but where other values play a central role. RD do not have an explicit position concerning these matters, but their point seems to be the following one: a theory is valuable so long as it offers good predictions, so long as it is useful for our purposes, no matter whether or not it mirrors the facts. And understanding comes along with a good theory. If we do not pursue this line of interpretation it is hard to justify their relativist principle of contextual understanding.
From this situation we can conclude that they favor the pragmatic side of science over its epistemic side: scientific theories are good as long as they help us to obtain good predictions and to deal with the world, no matter how faithful an image of the facts they offer. This being the case, we are free to impose our ideals of natural order, be it at the level of the ontology presupposed by our theories or the level of the shape of the explanations. But we can raise the following question for such a point of view: how can a theory that does not reflect reality help us deal with reality in a successful way?
If we want science to offer a faithful image of the world, given that causality is a relation between things, our theories must explain by invoking causal relations. On the other hand, if we consider that the world does not have a causal structure or that it is impossible to get access to the structure of the world, the methodological constraints as far as an explanation is concerned are left open. Therefore, we can have the following combinations: 1. the structure of the world is causal and explanation is given in terms of causality; 2. the structure of the world is causal and explanation is not given in terms of causality; 3. the structure of the world is not causal and explanation in given in terms of causality; 4. the structure of the world is not causal and explanation is not given in terms of causality.
In the first case, our idea of natural order is a faithful image of the world and the fact that successful explanations are given in terms of causality is not a surprising coincidence. Furthermore, a true explanation must be causal and there is no space for historic divergence. The second and the third cases seem a little bit strange, because on these models it is hard to account for the success of science.
The fact that relativism makes it difficult to explain the success of science, gives us a good reason to reject relativism. Therefore, I think that the understanding of things (in RD's terms) has to be objective and not historical and context-relative. And if it is context-relative, this state should be overcome by better developments, so that science should be continuous and cumulative. In this context, we better give up the theory of understanding as theory of explanation for a realist theory of explanation (and also give back to truth and knowledge their central place) and keep the notion of understanding for better purposes.
1.2.
The previous section pictured the image of science as aiming at constructing better and better theories as better and better images of things. In connection to this idea two points could be raised: 1. the construction of scientific explanations is a dynamic process which involves human minds, so that an explanation is not only a piece of information in a book, it is a tool with which we unravel the world and which we should master. Therefore, I think that we can find a place to the idea of understanding in this particular context, as a psychological side of the process of acquiring scientific information. 2. in our lives we need to uncover more or less of the structure of why things happen, so that we can put forward the idea that understanding comes into degrees.
1.2.1.
By saying that understanding has its own role in acquiring scientific information about things I am in line with RD. Nevertheless, my objection to their theory is that they do not make this idea explicit enough.
Theories themselves are complex constructions which involve a pattern of dependence between their statements. Therefore, some of the statements are considered as immediately known, like the mathematical axioms and do not need further justification, whereas others stand in need of justification. This justification is achieved by comparison and support from the facts or by derivation from other statements considered true and justified. Is there any need of understanding in this picture? Yes, and I will try to explain why: I think that we can view the acquisition of scientific information as a complex process, in which our mind is involved and seeks to grasp something from outside itself. This complex process involves also the mental process of understanding.
When it comes to explaining the intelligibility of theories, we can see that RD shed light only on one of the two equally important features of theories, namely qualitative prediction, leaving aside the fact that theories have also other functions. Nevertheless, I think that choosing this aspect is not unmotivated and it helps us shed light on the definition of understanding that somehow lurks in the background: understanding is the psychological grasp of scientific information, so that we can say that we have understanding of information when it (having a justified true belief) is accompanied by a feeling of confidence that things are the way our statements say they are.
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For a better image of the previously stated ideas, let us consider the following case: at a particular time in a scientific community, scientists are presented with a theory from future, let's say a theory that in normal conditions they would have reached after 200 years; the theory is true as far as its target of phenomena is concerned and more than that it is perfectly justified, so that it constitutes valuable scientific information. Can we say that the scientists of that particular community understand the theory in question? I think that the answer is no, they do not understand the theory and from considering this possibility, we can see where understanding can be placed. It occurs in the active process of achieving information and in the process of justification. The scientists of the community in question will achieve understanding when they will succeed to retrace the process of construction and justification of the theory in question.
We can now better see why knowledge should be accompanied by understanding at the level of the human mind and why understanding is a counterpart of knowledge. The truth of the belief has to be made manifest to the human mind, a true proposition for which I can not assess the truth is unintelligible for my mind. And the same observation could be made for justification: in order to see or to understand that a statement is justified I have to be capable to reconstruct this process of justification. On the other hand, the fact that a particular piece of scientific information is true and even justified (with justification things are more complicated because justification seems to be context-relative, so that a statement or collection of statements is justified for someone) does not guarantee that it is also intelligible or understood.
1.2.2.
The following point I want to raise is the possibility of constructing a concept of understanding (I mention here that I will use in this section the term "understanding" as RD use it, meaning explanation/understanding things and not in the sense introduced in the previous paragraph of psychological counterpart of knowledge even though they are related) that allows degrees. RD seem to suggest that understanding does not come in degrees: every scientific community has understanding in its own right and does not seem to be superior to the understanding of other communities; on the other hand quantitative prediction does not seem to count at all in the process of understanding things and this is the second point where we can introduce the idea if degrees of understanding. What I want to suggest in the following paragraphs is that RD's principle of intelligibility of theories is false or at least incomplete.
I think that we can assess the value of this principle if we relate it to the functions of a scientific theory, about which I have already made some remarks in the context of discussing explanation. The aim of science is to give us good explanations and predictions. This process of explaining and predicting is applied both to particular events and to laws. We want to understand why certain general groups of events happen and we want also to understand why a certain event happened: for example we want to understand both why buildings collapse under certain kinds of pressure and want to understand why a particular building collapsed given an earthquake of magnitude x. A good physical theory will provide us with a general theory of why buildings are likely to collapse in cases where some forces are applied to certain objects and also with a formula/equation that is aimed at describing the phenomenon. Using this theory and information about the conditions about the particular case which we want to understand, we can derive an explanation why the event happened. RD seem to ignore this level of understanding of particular events when they put forward their criterion of intelligibility of theories. We can introduce here a distinction between superficially and profoundly understanding an event (or why a particular event happened). Therefore, I can say that I understand why the building collapsed because I know that it was a devastating earthquake, and in case of this kind of earthquakes most buildings are likely to collapse. Can I say in this case that I have a profound understanding of the event rather than a merely superficially one or no understanding at all? I think not. More than that, I don't seem to have a scientific understanding of the event rather than a common sense one; therefore, we can conclude that science is concerned with a profound understanding because otherwise it would be useless.
For not depriving the common people of understanding, I think that it is better to introduce the idea that understanding is linked with our aims, and to say that when it comes to everyday life it does not matter whether we have a profound or superficial understanding, but when it comes to science, or when we exercise our profession it matters. Now we can reanalyze the principle from the point of view suggested above. The point that I raised in connection with science is one that I firmly endorse: science must give both quantitative and qualitative explanations and predictions and to offer us the possibility to go as deep as possible into the structure of the matter. This aspect is very well reflected in the construction of scientific theories which offer not only qualitative descriptions of the relations between things but also precise mathematical descriptions of these relations. But apart from the scientific construction per se, there is the application of our theories to phenomena and I think that here we have a space of relativity because the application of science seems to come in degrees and to depend on contextual needs. Therefore, if I am involved in the business of constructing buildings I must have the profound understanding invoked before, on the other hand if I watch the news and want to understand what happened, it is sufficient to have the less profound understanding.
III. Some Thoughts about Understanding
I think that the prospect of understanding a false theory gives us grounds to consider that understanding is a weaker notion than truth and is concerned directly with the psychological aspect of knowledge and only indirectly with understanding things in the sense of having true theories about them. Understanding seems to be linked more with giving reasons; in this sense, as long as you can reconstruct the events in a coherent manner with a causal structure or a structure of reasons, you understand. The important fact is that this structure does not need to correspond faithfully to the things in order to convey understanding, I think that it is sufficient to be plausible and coherent in order to do so.
On the other hand, as far as understanding the theories is concerned, we can conclude that understanding is concerned more with the semantic level of our scientific information than with the relation between information and the object it represents. Therefore, the notion of understanding is more suitable to describe the idea of grasping theories or explanations. Now let us analyze some examples from everyday language for the idea of understanding.
1. We say that we understand someone's discourse in the sense that we can represent the information the message is intended to convey given the fact that we have access to the meaning of the words it is composed of.
2.
For understanding as coherent structure of causes and reasons we can analyze the following example. Suppose that one of someone's friends suddenly begins to behave in a strange way and as this person can not see any reason for this change of behavior we say that he can't understand his behavior or he doesn't understand why he behaves in such a manner. Let's suppose that one of my friends suddenly begins not to communicate with me; at the same time, we both know that he owes me a large sum of money. Meanwhile, he has a sudden accident which leads to a partial loss of memory but I do not have any information about this fact. So long as in the first scenario I can construct with the available pieces a coherent story considering that the cause of the strange behavior is the debt, I will say that I understand his behavior even though the available information does not describe the true reasons of the strange behavior, the real cause being the loss of memory not the fact that owes me money and avoids me for this reason. More than that, if I happen to find out the real causal structure of the behavior my previous state of understanding does not seem to vanish into lack of understanding, which suggest that understanding is little dependent on the relation of truth as correspondence. Is my state understanding different when I do not know the real cause but can construct a plausible story different from the understanding which results from knowledge of the real cause? Can I say that in the first case I had only the impression of understanding, having real understanding only in the second case?
I think that this story can give us sufficient ground to argue that understanding is the sum of two factors: an impression of understanding, which from the subjective point of view represents understanding and which we can associate with the psychological side of knowledge as characterized in the previous section in connection with RD's theory and an objective idea of understanding which is necessarily linked with having a correct explanation. This second type of understanding associates to the subjective impression of understanding the objective dimension that the things correspond to this subjective image. Given this context I think that it is more appropriate to keep the term understanding for the subjective impression/felling of understanding and to keep for the objective idea the notion of valuable scientific information or truth as explained in the previous section; this does not preclude the fact that in the cases of grasping valuable theories the two aspects are both present. Understanding in the objective sense is an ideal before our eyes in the same measure as having a true theory of phenomena is an ideal. Our successive gaining of knowledge is a process of perpetually giving up impressions of understanding; the point when we give up this impression is the point where we detect an incoherence in our explanations, in our ways of giving account of the things.
On the other hand, we can link explanation with a particular context so that in some cases a superficial explanation is sufficient for our purposes and in other cases we need a more profound explanation; we can apply the same kind of argument for understanding, or more specifically for the objective counterpart of the subjective process of understanding (explanation as we saw in the previous section comes into degrees). Therefore, the contextual purposes determine a particular amount of understanding which is sufficient for the context. In some contexts it can happen to need less than an exact quantitative explanation of some event or less than the actual causes that brought about the event.
Now we can apply these ideas to the previous discussed notions of understanding. First, understanding as grasping theories. Here the semantic dimension of understanding seems to play a major role. And given this context I think that it is relatively easy to account for the phenomena of understanding false theories; the presence of this fact reveals us that we can grasp not only true theories but also false theories so that understanding is not necessary linked with truth. We understand false theories as far as on the one hand understand the meaning of the statements implied in the construction of such a theory and on the other hand we are in a position to see that they put a rational structure in the things they are dealing with, even though they are false when confronted with further experiments.
A person who is not quite a scientist can understand a true theory even in the absence of the skills to put the theory in practice and to actually derive some predictions and to construe explanations for actual events; as long as he grasps the meaning of the sentences and perceives an apparent rational structure in the information grasped and comes to see the things in the manner of the theories. On the other hand, scientists seem to have a more profound grasping which involves the capacity to put the theory to work, to understand things with the help of the theory. But even scientists happen to understand with the help of theories which are not quite in correspondence with the facts so long as we can derive good predictions from a false theory.
Therefore, if understanding with involves the actual ability to derive empirical consequences from the theory and to compare them with the facts, it is a too high standard imposed on understanding, which makes this notion tied only to scientific practice, which seems counter-intuitive. This seems to be the thesis of RD which I think is very strong.
The analysis of understanding involves at least two things in my opinion: 1. we seek to have an image of things with the help of better and better theories, with theories which are closer and closer to truth (understood as correspondence), but in this process we do not have access to the objective relation of correspondence of our theories to facts and thus are confined to the circle of the subjective condition of knowledge, which we choose to name understanding; 2. we can say that we obtain an image of the things with the help of intelligible theories, theories which we can grasp by grasping the meaning of their statements and by succeeding to see that the things are as they depict them to be.
